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Abstract. In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated 
dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox 
developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of 
following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of 
'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to 
maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions 
regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates 
contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of 
intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox. 
In this paper I argue that Coates' second-order dispositional account 
cannot solve the sceptic's problems regarding meaning and normativity. 
My main contention is that in order for second-order dispositions to be 
able to effectively regulate the coordinated responses constitutive of 
first-order dispositions, those first order dispositions must be 
independently identifiable. Yet that's precisely what Kripke's sceptical 
argument calls into question. I shall also argue, in a more positive 
fashion, that Coates' own appeal to practical breakdowns may suggest a 
different —and more effective— response to the sceptic's concern. 
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Kripke's monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule 
introduces one of the most interesting (not to say devilish) 
philosophical problems afflicting the development of a theory of 
meaning. The target of Kripke's argument is the very notion of 
meaning characterized as that conceptual element (rule) attached to 
the expressions of a language which determines their reference, and 
in virtue of which we can say when the expressions have been used 
correctly or incorrectly. In order to develop the argument, we are 
asked to imagine a radical sceptic who claims that, given the way I 
have used 'plus' in the past, and since I never performed additions 
with numbers greater that 57, that when faced with the new 
computation '68 + 57', my correct answer should be '5'. The idea is 
that, faced with this new addition, I should apply the same function 
or rule that I applied in the past. But which function is this? Since, 
by hypothesis, I can only invoke facts concerning myself and since I 
have performed only a finite number of additions in the past, how 
can I be sure how to go on? After all 
 
perhaps in the past I used 'plus' and '+' to denote a function 
which I will call 'quus' and symbolize by '≈'. It is defined by: 
 
   x ≈ y = x + y,  if x, y   <  57 
            = 5    otherwise 
 
(Kripke, 1982, pp. 8-9) 
 
 The problem arises since the theory can't distinguish between 
someone mistakenly using a word and someone (correctly) meaning 
something completely different when using that word. As Kripke 
likes to put it, the problem is that there doesn't seem to be a fact of 
the matter about the speaker's mental states or (occurrent or 
dispositional) behavior that justifies her meaning e. g. plus by 'plus' 
instead of some other bizarre function. 
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 Kripke is particularly interested in showing how a 
dispositional account cannot possibly solve the sceptical paradox. 
He summarizes his objections against dispositional accounts as 
follows (Kripke, 1982, p. 28): 
 
if the dispositionalist attempts to define which function I 
meant as the function determined by the answer I am disposed 
to give for arbitrarily large arguments, he ignores the fact that 
my dispositions extend to only finitely many cases. If he tries 
to appeal to my responses under idealized conditions that 
overcome this finiteness, he will succeed only if the 
idealization includes a specification that I will still respond, 
under these idealized conditions, according to the infinite 
table of the function I actually meant. But then the circularity 
of the procedure is evident. The idealized dispositions are 
determinate only because it is already settled which function I 
meant. 
 
 In a recent paper Paul Coates has argued against the 
soundness of Kripke's arguments (Coates, 1997). Coates believes 
that the difficulties Kripke encounters in the dispositional account 
he sketches are just the natural consequence of its simplicity. A 
more sophisticated dispositionalist view, Coates contends, can meet 
the sceptic's challenge and thus provide both a naturalistic basis for 
the normativity of intentional properties and a necessary condition 
for differentiating between original and derived intentionality. The 
sophistication of the account consists in the appeal to second-order 
dispositions. The idea is based on an analogy with the notion of 
homeostasis. Second-order dispositions seek to maintain a 
consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions (see below) 
regarding linguistic behavior, much as a thermostat (or other 
homeostatic device) might maintain a consistent room temperature. 
 In this paper I argue that Coates' sophisticated dispositional 
account cannot solve Kripke's sceptic's problems regarding meaning 
and normativity. I claim that, in order for second-order dispositions 
to be able to 'homeostatically' regulate the coordinated responses 
constitutive of first-order dispositions, the content of the first order 
dispositions must already be fixed, and that's precisely what the 
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sceptic challenges. Coates' proposal thus begs the question against 
the sceptic. I shall proceed like this. First, I will analyze the notion of 
homeostasis upon which Coates' proposal is built and show that the 
tendency to maintain internal stability in an organism by 
automatically compensating for environmental changes only makes 
sense on the assumption that the target environmental parameters 
can be independently determined. I then criticize the very notion of 
a second-order semantic disposition and show that, however 
interpreted, it cannot undermine Kripke's original argument against 
basic dispositionalist accounts. I finally argue, in a more positive 
fashion, that Coates' appeal to practical breakdowns might yet 
suggest a different, but more effective, response to the sceptical 
concerns. I have no interest, however, in criticizing Kripke's own 
argument, either on its own or from the point of view of its accuracy 
as an interpretation of Wittgenstein's original remarks. The 
structure of my argument is basically: if Kripke's arguments against 
the simple dispositionalist are sound, then increasing the complexity 




2. The Problem(s) 
 
 According to Coates, Kripke's response to the dispositionalist 
(which he calls the 'mistake objection') contains four distinct 
arguments: (i) the 'justification objection', which suggests that the 
dispositionalist cannot explain 'what it is that justifies a person in 
using words in the way she does at a given time' (Coates, 1997, p. 
173) nor what constitutes a person's intention to maintain a 
constant meaning across time. Coates calls these two different 
aspects of the problem the extension and the aiming problem 
respectively (see below); (ii) the 'bent rule objection', which points 
out that the dispositionalist cannot rule out the possibility of an 
agent suddenly altering her use of a word in a quus-like fashion; (iii) 
the 'derived intentionality objection', which challenges the 
dispositionalist to find objective facts about the states of a machine 
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in virtue of which we can decide whether it is malfunctioning or just 
following a different function; and, finally, (iv) the 'systematic 
mistake objection', which states that the dispositionalist cannot give 
an account of the difference between an agent uniformly and 
repeatedly making a mistake about the meaning of a word (even 
when all her physical conditions and the conditions of her 
environment are optimal) and an agent meaning something 
completely different by that word.  
 I believe that, despite all these subdivisions, the 
dispositionalist really faces a single problem, but I will not argue for 
that explicitly. Instead I will target the so-called justification 
objection because Coates' attempts to show how a sophisticated 
dispositionalist account can resolve Kripke's other objections are 
just variations of the argument he uses against the justification 
problem. As I said, Coates presents the objection in two different 
ways: as involving an extension problem and an aiming problem. 
 The extension problem is not just the problem of fixing the 
reference/extension of a term. The way Coates formulates it suggest 
that the extension problem is the problem of fixing the meaning 
(both extension and intension) of a term for a speaker at a given 
time:  
 
[t]hus one problem with the crude dispositional account is 
that it gets the extension of a term wrong, by failing to allow 
that what a person means by a term and how she is in practice 
disposed to use that term may diverge ... I shall refer to [this 
aspect of the justification objection] as 'the extension 
problem'. 
 
(Coates, 1997, p. 174, my emphasis) 
 
 However, the extension problem is not the only one involved 
in Kripke's response to the dispositionalist. There is also what 
Coates, following Sartorelli (1991), calls the aiming problem, 
namely, how to account for a speaker's intention to keep the 
meaning of a word constant across time. In Sartorelli's words, the 
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normativity of meaning involves two aspects: determining the 
speaker's target (Coates' extension problem), and determining the 
speaker's intention to aim at the target (Coates' aiming problem) 
(Sartorelli, 1991, p. 81). If Coates is right, there are thus two distinct 
dimensions to the sceptical paradox: one concerns how to fix the 
speaker's target (meaning) when she uses a word, the other 
concerns the speaker's intention to aim at the same target over time. 
 According to Kripke, there are two conditions that any 
response to the sceptic has to meet. The challenge is (a) to find a 
fact of the matter about the user of a term that constitutes her 
meaning one thing rather than other and (b) to show that the 
identification of such a fact constitutes a justification of her use of 
the term as correct. Following Kripke's example, we have to find a 
fact of the matter about the agent that constitutes her having meant 
plus by 'plus' rather than quus and a justification of why '125' is the 
right answer to '68 + 57' instead of '5'. 
 Coates attempts to meet these two conditions by defending a 
sophisticated dispositional account of meaning that operates at two 
different levels. First-order dispositions are the input-out functions 
describing a system's behavior at a given time. Extended first-order 
dispositions are then the input-out functions describing a system's 
behavior, including 'those she would repeat after checking' (p. 175). 
The full repertoire of a system's extended first-order dispositions, 
according to Coates, fixes the meaning of the terms the system uses. 
Second-order dispositions, on the other hand, are Coates' solution to 
the aiming problem. They allegedly keep extended first-order 
dispositions constant across time. Second-order dispositions are 
thus introduced to account for that aspect of meaning to which 
Sartorelli draws attention when he talks about the need to 
determine the speaker's intention to aim at the target. 
 In analyzing the plausibility of Coates' proposal we thus face a 
double task. Since extended first-order dispositions are put forward 
as constituting the fact of the matter regarding the user's meaning 
plus by 'plus' (instead of quus), we will have to see whether and how 
those extended first-order dispositions can constitute the speaker's 
meaning one thing rather than other. Secondly, we will have to see 
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how the identification of second-order dispositions can constitute a 
justification of the speaker's correct use of 'plus' when faced with 
the new computation '68 + 57', i.e. we have to show how an appeal 
to second-order dispositions justifies that '125' as the right answer 
to that computation. I shall argue that neither of these burdens can 
be discharged by a second-order dispositionalist account. I will first 
approach the topic from the point of view of the cyberneticist's use 
of the notion of homeostasis. I will then move on to more 





 Coates glosses the central idea of his treatment in the 
following way: 
 
The basic idea ... is that for a person (or more generally, any 
system) to mean something by her responses, the dispositions 
governing the pattern of those responses must be subject to 
something analogous to "homeostasis" 
(Coates, 1997, p. 172) 
 
 The general idea, as it is developed later in the paper, is that 
we can identify an agent's (here and now) commitment to a certain 
pattern of future use of a word as "essentially supervening upon a 
second-order disposition to maintain the first-order dispositions 
governing [its] use" (Coates, 1997, p. 181). The analogy with 
something like homeostasis is thus clear. A homeostatic process (the 
term was originally coined by Walter Cannon (1932) in a 
physiological text) is one in which some aspect of a system's 
behavior is kept in line by some combination of feedback and 
corrective activity. For example, the temperature of the human body 
is homeostatically regulated so as to remain (under most conditions) 
within highly constrained limits. If it begins to diverge from the 
acceptable range, biological alarm bells sound and a variety of 
compensatory mechanisms come into play. 
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 The notion of homeostasis was also prominent in the 
cybernetics literature of the forties and fifties (see e.g. Ashby (1952) 
(1956)) Norbert Wiener, in the pioneering (1948) text Cybernetics: 
Of Control and Communication in the Animal and The Machine 
notes that: 
 
A great group of cases in which some sort of feedback is not 
only exemplified in physiological phenomena, but is 
absolutely essential for the continuation of life, is found in 
what is known as homeostasis. The conditions under which 
life, especially healthy life, can continue in the higher animals, 
are quite narrow ... the osmotic pressure of the blood and its 
hydrogen-ion concentration must be held within strict limits ... 
our heart rate and blood pressure must be neither too high 
nor too low ... In short, our inner economy must contain an 
assembly of thermostats, automatic hydrogen-ion 
concentration controls, governors and the like, which could be 
adequate for a great chemical plant 
(Wiener, 1948, p. 135) 
 
 A little reflection, however, on the operation of any familiar 
homeostatic regulator will show that the appeal to (anything at all 
like) homeostasis cannot (on pain of magic or circularity) feature in 
a principled rebuttal of the sceptical challenge concerning meaning. 
To see why, consider a basic thermostat: just about the maximally 
simple case of a device capable of homeostatically regulating some 
property (viz., the temperature of a room). A typical thermostat 
works, in part, by exploiting the uneven rates of expansion (in 
response to temperature) of two metals (brass and iron) welded 
together into a bi-metallic strip. The brass expands at about twice 
the rate of the iron and so the strip bends, in the direction of the 
iron side, as heat increases. As the heat drops, the strip bends back 
in the direction of the brass. It is fixed at one end, and the other 
makes and breaks an electrical circuit according to the degree of 
bend. When you manually set the target temperature, you 
physically shift the position of the electrical contact, thus altering 
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the degree of bend (and hence the temperature) needed to make 
and break the circuit. As a result, when the temperature falls below 
the target, the heating is activated until the pre-set temperature is 
reached. At this point the bend in the strip no longer makes the 
required contact and the heating is shut off, until some future 
temperature drop causes the strip to bend back in the direction of 
the brass, close the circuit, and start the whole self-regulating 
process all over again. 
 Now, consider the case of the agent who (according to Coates) 
deploys something akin to homeostatic regulation to maintain the 
consistent use of a term despite occasional fluctuations (due to 
perceptual error or bad lighting conditions or whatever). For the 
trick to work, the system (in this case the agent) must have some 
way of knowing when a fluctuation has occurred. For it is her 
second-order disposition to identify and correct her own (first-
order) fluctuation that constitutes, on Coates' account, the 
determinate fact about what she means when she uses a term. In the 
case of thermostatic control, temperature fluctuations physically 
cause the bending of the bi-metallic strip that, in turn, regulates the 
heating and thus drives the system back to the target temperature. 
How is this to work in the case of meaning? 
 There are, it seems to me, just three options. First, it is magic. 
Second, the fluctuation is detected because the agent knows what 
she intended the term to mean, and is thus able to recognize a given 
usage as deviant. Or third, the fluctuation is signaled by some 
breakdown in practical activity. Let's rule out magic (although, in 
fact, magical homeostasis is exactly what the argument requires!). 
What about option 2 —the detection of a mismatch between 
intended and actual patterns of use? There are several passages 
where Coates seems to suggest something like this (e.g. passages on 
pp. 179, 183 and 186-187). The clearest of these passages in 
probably the following: 
 
Roughly speaking, the extension of the term that a subject 
understands is fixed by her extended first-order dispositions; 
whereas the fact that the subject takes that extension as 
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providing the standard to aim for ... is fixed by her ... second-
order dispositions to maintain those first-order dispositions. 
 
(Coates, 1997, pp. 181-182) 
 
 Now, it is difficult to see how extended first-order dispositions 
could be held accountable for fixing the fact of the matter regarding 
the subject's meaning plus by 'plus' (instead of quus) on their own. 
The only difference between crude first-order dispositions and 
Coates' extended version is that the latter, but not the former, seem 
to rely on some kind of feed-back from the environment which 
would alter the input-out functions responsible for the subject's 
behavior. But, in order for that for that feed-back to take place, the 
second-order dispositions must already be in place. 
 In other words, it is pretty clear that the subject's intention, at 
time t0 cannot be used as the comparison point to alert her to a 
deviation at time t1. For the whole point of the sceptical argument is 
to show that there can be nothing in the agent's current (at any 
time) intention that determines one future pattern of use as correct 
and another as a (corrigible) fluctuation. Coates talks, worryingly, of 
the subject 'aiming at consistency" (p. 187). But to appeal to 
introspective awareness of meaning is simply to reject the sceptical 
conclusion, not to offer any kind of counter-argument.  What we 
need is some clue as to in what such "aiming' might consist, and the 
suggestion is that aiming is grounded precisely by second-order 
dispositions (p. 181): 
 
It is the emphasis it places on the role of second-order 
dispositions that distinguishes the sophisticated dispositional 
proposal from its cruder predecessor. 
 
 So, it seems that, deep down, (and despite the talk about 
extended first-order dispositions) Coates is aware that the real 
challenge for his account is to describe some kind of non-
introspection based way in which the agent might recognize 
unwanted fluctuations in her patterns of use, and hence activate a 
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second-order ("homeostatic") disposition to bring her own 
performance back into line. Coates' principal suggestion —the third 
option mentioned above— is that breakdowns in practical activity 
provide just such non-introspective evidence (of improper 
fluctuation). Thus we read (p. 178) of a "tendency to correct errors 
when, roughly speaking, things turn out adversely". For example, 
when you try to ride the cow you had accidentally taken to be a 
horse, or when your woodworking project fails because your 
calculations have been made using a deviant notion of "plus" (pp. 
178-179). 
 As far as I can see, such appeals to practical breakdown 
constitute the only real candidate, in Coates' treatment, for a 
reliable signal able to trip some kind of self-regulating mechanism. 
But it should be clear that such practical signals are, ultimately, 
unable to fulfill such a role. For they could only fulfill that role if 
the agent is able to distinguish between breakdowns traceable to her 
failure to maintain a first-order disposition to use a word in such-
and-such a way, and breakdowns traceable to innocent and non-
semantic causes (such as a (real) horse being lively, or one piece of 
wood expanding because it got damp, and so on). Call this the 
"assignment of blame problem". The assignment of blame problem, I 
suggest, is soluble only if we simply assume that the original 
sceptical argument fails. For it is only if the agent can be relied 
upon to know how her original intentions should fix a pattern of 
future usage, that she can recognize a case of breakdown as rooted 
in deviation from that pattern. 
 In short, there is nothing in Coates' scenario capable of 
playing the role of an independently recognizable signal that the 
system is deviating from its pre-set semantic target. There is, to put 
it bluntly, no meaning-sensitive bi-metallic strip able to signal 
fluctuation when it occurs. Nor, as far as I can see, is it possible for 
there to be such an independently recognizable signal. But without 
one, the appeal to a second-order "homeostatic" disposition adds 
nothing to either the simple or the extended first-order case. So if 
the sceptical argument works in the first-order case (as Coates seems 
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willing to accept), the ascent to higher-order dispositions merely 






 I next approach the same issue circumventing the notion of 
homeostasis, and with more attention to Coates' specifically 
philosophical proposal. Coates provides a set of three necessary 
conditions that have to be met for a subject (S) to mean a feature 
(P) by a term ('F') at a given time T0: 
 
1. The extended dispositions of S at T0 are to apply the 
term 'F' only to input from P 
and 
2. S has a second-order disposition at T0 to maintain those 
extended dispositions in respect of 'F'.  
... 
(3) The second-order disposition that S has at T0 must be 
sufficiently robust.  
(Coates, 1997, pp. 182-183) 
 
 The key questions remain the same: to block the sceptical 
conclusion, we have to show what constitutes the fact of matter that 
allows us to say that S means P (rather than Q), and how the 
identification of such a fact constitutes a justification of 'F' being the 
right term to use. What we want, in other words, is to know how 
these three conditions allow us to move from the descriptive arena 
of dispositions to the normative terrain of how the subject ought to 
use the term 'F'. Coates is pretty explicit about this: 
 
The answer consists in the fact that I committed myself to 
using the word consistently, and that this commitment was 
grounded in a robust second-order disposition to be consistent 
in my first-order dispositions to use the term. 
(Coates, 1997, p. 183) 
 
 Now dispositions, classically understood, are always 
dispositions to behave. It makes sense to opt for a dispositionalist 
account when trying to provide a naturalistic explanation of 
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intentional properties because in appealing to dispositions we are 
appealing to concepts which are not themselves intentional. First-
order dispositions are given by the input-output function describing 
the system's behavior and therefore it is clear that they fit this 
characterization. However, it is not clear that second-order 
dispositions are dispositions in this sense. The main difficulty 
involving this notion can be formulated in the form of a dilemma 
each of whose horns reveals apparently insurmountable problems 
with Coates' sophisticated dispositional proposal. 
 On the one hand, if second-order dispositions are dispositions 
to behave, and since Coates seems to agree that Kripke's argument 
against simple dispositionalist proposals is sound1, it is difficult to 
see how the introduction of more dispositions (even if they belong 
to a higher level) can avoid Kripke's criticisms. What the sceptic is 
demanding is the specification of a non-semantic fact such that (a) 
it will determine what a subject means by any given word and (b) it 
will also determine what the subject ought to do —how she ought to 
use any given word— in each new instance. The simple 
dispositionalist account that Kripke analyzes does not meet these 
conditions because it keeps the relation of meaning and intention to 
future action at the behavioral descriptive level. But even if second-
order dispositions were somehow to determine what a subject means 
by a given word, second-order dispositions cannot determine how 
the subject ought to use the word since the subject could be second-
order disposed to maintain first-order dispositions to do all kind of 
things (e.g. to make systematic mistakes) and yet there is only one 
thing that she ought to do. 
 On the other hand, if second-order dispositions are not really 
dispositions to behave, but dispositions to mean (to mean precisely 
such-and-such whenever I have the first-order dispositions to use a 
given term in a particular way), then the very point of introducing 
such sophisticated dispositions has been defeated. Second-order 
dispositions become mental acts and as such they are again a proper 
target for Kripke's sceptical argument. The goal of providing a 
naturalistic explanation of intentional properties cannot possibly be 
reached. 
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 The way in which Coates characterizes the fact about what 
kind of first-order dispositions the subject's second-order 
dispositions keep stable seems to favor the latter interpretation. We 
are told that second-order dispositions allow the subject to be 
consistent in her first-order dispositions to use a term. Second-order 
dispositions are indeed introduced in order to account for what 
Sartorelli sees as one of the two elements of the normativity of 
meaning, namely, the subject's intention to use a word with the 
same meaning she used it in the past. But surely such a 
characterization of second-order dispositions is itself intentional 
(consistency being a paradigmatic semantic notion) and also 
circular. In order to maintain, in a consistent way, my first-order 
dispositions to use a word in new instances, we already have to 
know what semantic property is instantiated by the subject's first-
order dispositions. If Kripke's argument is right, then Coates' 
introduction of second-order dispositions simply cannot solve the 
problem, since it effectively begs the question against the sceptic. 
 
 
5. Mechanisms, Reiteration and Ordinary 
 Observational Terms 
 
 Even if we assume that second-order dispositions do somehow 
play the regulating role that Coates has assigned to them, and that 
they do this in a reliable, efficient (and suitably fallible) fashion, we 
still don't know how that is possible. Looking for mechanisms at the 
physical level will not do the job since physical mechanisms are just 
causal and the sceptic’s challenge is precisely to show what it is that 
allows us to differentiate between someone using a term correctly 
but making a mistake (i.e., the mechanisms are malfunctioning) and 
someone using the term in a deviant or bizarre fashion (the 
mechanisms work fine but the output is still not 'right'). Notice, in 
this regard, that Coates never really tells us what kind of 
mechanisms could explain how second-order dispositions are 
successful in performing their function. We can, however, find some 
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clues in some of the examples he uses as illustrations of his main 
thesis. 
 The main theme in all these illustrations is that, at least in the 
case of simple terms used to refer to ordinary observable properties 
(more about this below), environmental impacts upon the subject 
will guarantee that the relevant dispositions are corrected and kept 
in line. We can adapt one of Coates' examples to display this point. 
Let’s first see how Coates introduces the example: 
 
... in the mathematical case, the subject will have dispositions 
to use the word ‘plus’, again sometimes mistakenly. But she 
may find out, for example, in doing some carpentry in 
isolation, that certain calculations which she wrote down have 
led her astray: two lengths of wood do not match as had been 
expected, giving her the motive to check and revise her earlier 
employment of ‘plus’. In this manner a person’s extended 
dispositions will tend, in many cases, to lead her own use of a 
term to coincide with the correct one. 
(Coates, 1997, p. 178) 
 
 If I understand Coates correctly, the point of this argument is 
that one could stop the sceptic’s move by using the environment as 
a kind of ultimate normative check point. Second-order dispositions 
keep stable those first-order dispositions that don’t lead us 
completely astray when dealing with practical aspects of our 
environment. Thus, for example, imagine that I am paneling the 
floor of my study and I know that I need a piece of wood 125 inches 
long. I don’t have a piece that is that long but I have shorter ones. I 
measure their length and I find out that I have one which is 68 
inches long and another which is 57 inches long. When I add ‘68 + 
57’ to find out whether those two pieces of wood would have the 
same length as the space I want to cover, I am justified in saying 
that ‘125’ is the right answer. The correct answer couldn’t possibly 
be —despite the sceptic's claims— ‘5’ because I can see that the 
length of my two pieces of wood together is the same length as the 
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space I want to cover. This is incompatible with the hypothesis that I 
meant quus when adding 68 and 57. 
 Now, what Coates seems to ignore all through his paper is that 
the sceptical argument must be reiterated in cases like the one just 
mentioned. The sceptic should question my present interpretation 
of my past uses of e.g. ‘length’ and 'same' just as he did with the 
present interpretation of my past uses of ‘plus’. He can thus claim 
that whenever I used the expression ‘length’ in the past I really 
meant quength where the ‘quength’ of an item is the same as its 
length unless it is longer than 57 inches in which case it is 5 inches 
long. The space I am trying to cover is thus 5 inches long and so is 
the length of my two pieces of wood together. ‘5’ is thus the right 
answer and not ‘125’. 
 Of course the sceptic’s proposal gets increasingly wild. But, as 
Kripke says: ‘Wild it indubitably is, no doubt it is false; but if it is 
false, there must be some fact about my past usage that can be cited 
to refute it. For although the hypothesis is wild, it does not seem to 
be a priori impossible’ (Kripke, 1982, p. 9). The fact about my past 
usage that Coates cites is, of course, the fact about extended first-
order dispositions or (equivalently) first-order dispositions kept 
stable by second-order dispositions. However, as I have already 
argued, in order to keep the first-order dispositions constant, we 
must already know what semantic property is exhibited by the 
subject's first-order dispositions!  
 What seems to lie behind Coates’ faith in the power of the 
environment is his conviction that the sceptic’s challenge does not 
apply throughout language, and that it is only possible to make 
systematic mistakes when using terms that are somehow abstract or 
that, at least, involve some kind of calculation. Thus, for ‘ordinary 
observational terms’ like ‘green’ or even like ‘counting’, the idea 
that an agent could uniformly and repeatedly make a mistake about 
the meaning of a word, Coates argue, doesn't make sense. Coates' 
defense takes the form of a dilemma: either the environmental 
conditions force the truth upon the agent (as when she tries to bite 
an apple that's made of rubber) thereby blocking the propagation of 
the mistake, or there is, after all, no mistake whatsoever. Instead 
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what that situation shows is that the person using the term has 
attached a completely different meaning to the term and she is 
using the word correctly according to that meaning: 'Speakers whose 
responses deviate in a systematic fashion from others still attach a 
fixed meaning to their words. By their own standards, their 
meanings are determinate —it is just that their meanings differ from 
those of normal speakers of the language' (Coates, 1997, p. 191). 
 But neither line works as a reply to the sceptic, since Coates is 
now taking for granted precisely what the sceptic is questioning, 
namely, the possibility of attaching a fixed meaning to a word by 
appealing to facts about the subject's mental states or behavior. 
Indeed, examples such as Coates' are extensively criticized by Kripke 
as clear failures of the dispositionalist against the sceptic. In the 
case of ‘counting’ Coates thus seems to have completely missed 
Kripke’s point, since he describes the sceptic as acknowledging that 
the concept of addition can be characterized using more basic 
notions such as counting (cf. Coates, 1997, p. 193). This is, however, 
what Kripke has to say about such a proposal: 
 
... the sceptic can question my present interpretation of my 
past usage of ‘count’ as he did with ‘plus’. In particular, he can 
claim that by ‘count’ I formerly meant quount, where to 
‘quount’ a heap is to count it in the ordinary sense, unless the 
heap was formed as the union of two heaps, one of which has 
57 or more items, in which case one must automatically give 
the answer ‘5’ ... if ‘plus’ is explained in terms of ‘counting’, a 
non-standard interpretation of the latter will yield a non-
standard interpretation of the former. 
(Kripke, 1982, p. 16) 
 
 The same kind of argument can be applied to observational 
terms such as ‘green’, as it is in Goodman’s argument (cf. Goodman, 
1973, especially ch. III, § 4, pp. 72-81. See also Fetzer, 1993, pp. 30-
33). As in the case the woodworking failure, all the sceptic needs is 
to iterate the original argument again and again, applying it to any 
words used to characterize the meaning attached to e.g. 'green': 
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Perhaps by ‘green’, in the past I meant grue, and the color 
image, which indeed was grue, was meant to direct me to 
apply the word ‘green’ to grue objects always. If the blue 
object before me now is grue, then it falls in the extension of 
‘green’, as I meant it in the past. It is no help to suppose that 
in the past I stipulated that ‘green’ was to apply to all and only 
those things ‘of the same color as’ the sample. The sceptic can 
reinterpret ‘same color’ as same schmolor, where things have 
the same schmolor if ... 
(Kripke, 1982, p.20) 
 
 It might seem that in mentioning Goodman's 'grue' example, 
or in invoking Kripke's application of the sceptic paradox to 
observational terms such as 'green', I have simply overlooked 
Coates' claim that this problem is independent of the issues raised 
by the sceptic (p. 190). Coates claims that for observational terms 
such as 'green', and also for what he calls 'ordinary words', what the 
subject means when she uses those terms is fixed by her extended 
dispositions to linguistically behave in a given way. So, if a speaker 
uses 'green' in a systematically bizarre way, she is still attaching a 
fixed meaning to 'green'; it is just that this meaning of 'green' differ 
from the normal speaker's meaning of 'green'. The problem, Coates 
contends, doesn't fall under the sceptical umbrella: "[t]he problem 
raised by these cases is a problem about how the meanings of 
different speakers mesh together' (p. 191). The difference between a 
term like 'plus' and a term like 'green', we are told later, lies in the 
fact that a term like 'plus' is "governed by recursive rules to which 
we have introspective access and which we use in calculating. A 
term like 'plus' relates an indefinitely large range of differing inputs 
to correspondingly different outputs ... In contrast, for a term like 
'green', the input-output relation connects one kind of input —
wavelength of a certain range— with one type of output, the 
utterance of the term" (p. 192). 
 But I don't see how this issue could be considered completely 
independent of Kripke's sceptic move. After all, even if we agree 
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with Coates that the problem is one of different meanings "meshing 
together", we still have to find some normative criteria which 
determine how to individuate those different meanings in the first 
place, and that's precisely Kripke's sceptic's problem. To add that 
the difference between abstract terms such as 'plus' and 
observational terms such as 'green' is based on the existence or not 
of some set of recursive rules that the subject introspectively checks 
does not really help since, even for "ordinary words" such as 
'green', we still need some account of when the speaker is using 
them correctly. To assume, as Coates seems to do, that in the case of 
e.g. 'green', the matter of fixing the meaning is just one of 
connecting input to output (perception to utterance) is to 
undermine the normativity implicit in the very notion of (ordinary 
word) meaning. In other words, to say that speakers whose 
responses deviate in a systematic fashion from others attach a fixed 
(but different) meaning to their terms is just to conflate 
performance and correctness (cf. Kripke, 1982, p. 24). No matter 
how consistently and how systematically I give the answer ‘5’ to ‘57 
+ 68’, my answer is wrong, and the same is the case for 'green' if I 
consistently and systematically apply 'green' to objects which are 
blue and round. To claim that if I answer that way repeatedly and 
systematically, I am just meaning something different by 'plus' or 
'green' is precisely to grant the sceptic's argument. Once that step is 
taken, we can say there is nothing about the agent that we can 
invoke such that it will determine when the agent is wrongly 
following a particular rule rather than correctly following a 
completely different one. So, if Kripke's arguments against the 
dispositionalist are sound, then Coates' sophisticated dispositionalist 
account doesn't do anything to stop the sceptic's move. 
 
 
6. Some positive thoughts, and a conclusion 
 
 Coates' sophisticated dispositionalist account cannot, it seems, 
ultimately defeat the sceptic’s devastating argument. I would like to 
end, nonetheless, by exploring some more positive options. In 
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particular, I think there may be a better way to exploit Coates' 
pragmatic idea of 'things going wrong' in the environment. The use 
Coates makes of this idea (as in the woodwork or the cow/horse 
examples) has two faults: the reference to the environment is purely 
physical (the social aspect of the environment is never appealed to) 
and there is a presupposition that it's only when the meaning we 
attach to the words fails to 'fit' the external environment that our 
projects fail (begging the question against the sceptic). However, if 
we remove these two elements, we find ourselves very close to what 
Kripke himself calls the sceptical solution to the paradox (a solution 
notably lacking in reference to second-order dispositions). 
 The solution is called 'sceptical' because it concedes the 
central sceptical point: if we seek to justify our linguistic practices 
by appeal to facts about individuals' mental states, or behaviors, or 
dispositions to behave, we are doomed. But although that kind of 
justification is untenable, we may not need it after all. We won't 
need it if we can show that the justification of an agent's linguistic 
behavior looks beyond the isolated agent. The environment counts, 
but it's the social environment that is most relevant. The 
justification we are looking for comes from the network of social 
responses of the community in which the individual is embedded. 
The game of ascribing concepts like 'plus' is thus rooted in a 
network of social practices and commitments to act in a certain way. 
There is no hidden conceptual element attaching meanings to 
words. We don't display co-ordinated responses to new problems 
involving previously used concepts ('68 + 57') because we share a 
conceptual element attached to 'plus'. Rather, to say of someone 
that she means plus by 'plus' is to locate her in a web of social 
patterns, regularities and interests; a web characteristic of the 
community to which she belongs.  
 Coates' appeal to the environment seems to factor out such 
social-practical aspects of the justification of our linguistic behavior. 
When he talks about 'things turning out adversely', he is seeking a 
reliable signal able to drive some kind of self-regulating mechanism. 
But since the notion of the environment that is invoked doesn't 
include other people, or indeed any social factor, we remain at the 
 23 
mercy of the sceptic, i.e., we are left seeking the justification of our 
linguistic practices in the realm of facts about individuals2. Hence 
all the problems discussed in the present text. 
 Of course, it might be argued that my own qualified 
endorsement of the sceptical solution ignores the point made by 
Hoffman (1985), Boghossian (1989), and Blackburn (1984) —among 
others— that by relying on the social environment for justification, 
the account becomes circular3. In fact, I think that the only way of 
avoiding the threat of circularity mentioned by Coates and 
suggested by these authors is precisely to treat normativity as 
ineliminable from semantics and to understand it as immanent in 
('instituted by') practical activities in a social world. In other words, 
the circularity is avoided by taken the social environment as the 
primary locus of normativity and accounting for the normativity 
involved in the individual's use of language in a derivative way (see 
e.g. Brandom, 1994). I have argued elsewhere that reductive 
attempts to naturalize semantics, i.e., attempts to naturalize 
semantics following a higher-to-lower explanatory strategy cannot, 
ultimately, make contact with the normative features of meaning 
their advocates are trying to explain. Either that or they become 
circular by impregnating the merely physical with normative 
notions that don't belong there (see Toribio, 1998. Coates' 
sophisticated dispositionalist account belongs to this latter kind). 
 But in the end, it boils down to this: if Kripke's arguments 
against the simple dispositionalist are sound (as Coates concedes), 
then increasing the complexity of the dispositional position does 
nothing to undermine those arguments. If there is a solution to the 
sceptical paradox at all, it may well involve some kind of appeal to 
successful environmental activity; but only if the environment and 
activities include not just the physical world in which the individual 
is embedded but also, and crucially, the social forces and structures 
which surround her. The direct appeal to second order dispositions 




1 See e.g. p. 184: "Now if the past fact which justifies my present 
response was simply my first-order disposition to use a word in a 
certain way, then we would be unable to distinguish the case where I 
mean to use '*' to apply to a specific function, and the case where I 
mean to use '*' randomly". 
 
2 In fact, Coates seems surprisingly comfortable with the idea of 
a 'private language' and with the possibility of purely individualistic 
facts about meaning: 'In choosing an example where an individual 
may be considered in isolation from any community I do not deny 
that the situation is different when social pressures persuade us to 
use words with the same meanings as our peers. But on the 
dispositional account, it is a contingent matter that a commitment 
to mean something is normally stronger in the case of the use of 
public language' (Coates, 1997, p. 184, my italics). 
 
3 Coates mentions this point in footnote 4 of the paper. 
 
4 Thanks to Jim Fetzer and an anonymous referee for valuable 
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